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COMMENTS
CIGARETTE MANUFACTURERS' WARRANTY:
APPLICATION OF OLD LAW OR NEW
I.
INTRODUCTION
Products liability has been, and continues to be, the subject of
considerable controversy, and developing guidelines in this area will re-
quire the combined efforts of judges, lawyers and scholars.' "With the
liability of the seller of chattels to the ultimate consumer once established
on the basis of negligence, it was to be expected that some attempt would
be made to carry his responsibility even further, and to find some ground
for strict liability which' would make him in effect an insurer of the
safety of the product, even though he had exercised all reasonable care." 2
At common law, this attempt to impose a greater liability upon the
manufacturer was manifested in the creation of the action for breach of
warranty. An action on a warranty was regarded for centuries as an
action of deceit, and it was not until 1778 that the first reported decision
of an action in assumpsit on a warranty appeared.3 Although retaining its
tort character, a warranty action is now generally characterized as con-
tractual in nature.4 The English Sale of Goods Act,5 which codified
the existing case law, was the first statutory characterization of warranty
as contractual. Section (15) 2 of the Uniform Sales Act6 was copied
almost verbatim from the first part of Section 14 (2) of the English
Statute.7 The implied condition of merchantable quality found in Uniform
Sales Act is now specifically described in the Uniform Commercial Code
as "a warranty ... implied in a contract .... ,,8
1. Noel, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 50 A.B.A.J. 446 (1964).
2. PROSS4R, TORTS § 97 (3d ed. 1964).
3. Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Doug. 18 (1778) ; 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 2689(Rev. ed. 1936).
4. Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (1815).
5. 56 & 57 Vict., ch. 71, § 14(2):
Where goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of
that description (whether he be the manufacturer or not), there is an implied
condition that the goods shall be of merchantible quality; provided that if the
buyer has examined the goods, there shall be no implied condition as regards
defects which such examination ought to have revealed.
6. 1 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. § 15(2) (1965 Supp.).
7. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantible Quality, 27 MINN. L. Rev.
117 (1943).
8. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL Cone § 2-314 (1962).
(546)
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While liability in warranty is termed strict, this does not mean that
goods are warranted to be foolproof, or incapable of producing injury.
By and large, the standard of safety for goods is the same under the
warranty theory as under the negligence theory. In either action, the
plaintiff must show: (1) that the goods were unreasonably dangerous
either for the use to which they would ordinarily be put or for some
special use which was brought to the attention of the defendant, and (2)
that the unreasonably dangerous condition existed when the goods left
the defendant's hands.9 However, considerable authority rejects these
standards when the product is for human consumption. A more severe
standard is then imposed: "The purveyor of victuals for human con-
sumption always has been held to a special responsibility under the common
law, although its precise nature and extent in the older cases has been a
matter of some disagreement" (Emphasis added.). 1° The reasons for
imposing this special responsibility are numerous. The primary contention
is that
when a manufacturer or a processor places food products in the
channels of commerce for human consumption he assumes a special
responsibility to the public. The consumer, helpless to protect him-
self, has the right to expect, in the case of products so vitally important
to human existence and the health of the community, as food and
other products for intimate bodily use, that the products are reason-
ably fit for the purposes for which they were sold. . . . Public policy
demands that the burden of any accidental injuries caused by such
products be placed upon those who produce the risks. The injuries
from knowable risks are a cost of production for the industry to bear;
they are passed on to the consumers. The consumer of such products
is entitled to a maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and
9. 2 HARPER & JAMS, TORTS § 28.22 (1956) ; but see, Picker X-Ray Corp. v.
General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919, 922 (D.C. Mun. App. 1962) which held that the
concepts of negligence and fault, as defined by negligence standards, have no place in
warranty recovery cases.
10. PROSSER, TORTS § 97 (3d ed. 1964). This special responsibility borders on
absolute liability.
Liability in such cases is not based on negligence, nor on a breach of the
usual implied contractual warranty, but on the broad principles of the public
policy to protect human health and life .... It seems to be the rule that where
food products sold for human consumption are unfit for that purpose, there is such
an utter failure of the purpose for which the food is sold and the consequences of
eating unsound food are so disastrous to human health and life that the law
imposes a warranty of purity in favor of the ultimate consumer as a matter of
public policy.
Since very early times the common law has applied more stringent rules to
sales of food than to sales of other merchandise. . . . A majority of American
courts that have followed this holding have not based such warranty upon an
implied term in the contract between buyer and seller, nor upon any reliance by
the buyer on the representation of the seller, but have imposed it as a matter
of public policy in order to discourage the sale of unwholesome food.
Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942); accord,
Wiedeman v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93, 49 N.E. 210 (1897) ; Parks v. C. C. Yost Pie Co.,
93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202 (1914) ; Hoover v. Peters, 18 Mich. 51 (1869) ; Race v.
Krum, 222 N.Y. 410, 118 N.E. 854 (1918) ; Catani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95 Atl.
931 (1915).
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the proper persons to afford it are those who receive the benefits from
manufacturing and marketing the products."
To ascertain the "knowable risks" one must use such foresight as is
appropriate to his enterprise.1 2 It is submitted that, although strict liability
as applied to products for human consumption appears to be limited by
the concept of foreseeability, the standard of foreseeability in this area is
unlimited, with the manufacturer becoming, in turn, an insurer.
II.
NATURE OF THE PRODUCT
In order to determine the elements of products liability law applicable
to cigarettes, it is necessary to determine the nature of that product.
A survey of the case law dealing with cigarettes reveals that they have
been classified with "food and drink and other articles intended for
human consumption as products intended for intimate bodily use.' 3
However, these cases present a slight anomaly since they were based in
part upon a tentative draft of the Restatement of Torts, Second and, in
the final draft of this section, the language concerning cigarettes was
deleted.14 Though the reasons for the deletion of cigarettes from this
section are uncertain, its effect is rather clear. A plaintiff is subjected to
the burden of showing that the standard of special responsibility extends
to cigarettes, thereby bringing them within the above category. Although
the Restatement has raised a question as to this classification, most courts
will be quick to hold that cigarettes are within the category of products
intended for human consumption. 1 5
11. Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 36 (5th Cir. 1963).
12. See, Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15, 51-52 (1953):
This is a day of synthetic living, when to an ever-increasing extent our
population is dependent upon mass producers for its food and drink, its cures and
complexions, its apparel and gadgets. There no longer are natural or simple
products but complex ones whose compositions and qualities are often secret.
Such a dependent society must exact a greater care than in more simple days and
must require from manufacturers or products increased integrity and caution as
the only protection of its safety and well-being. Purchasers cannot try out drugs
to determine whether they kill or cure. Consumers cannot test the youngster's
cowboy suit or the wife's sweater to see if they are apt to burst into fatal flames.
Carriers, by land or by sea, cannot experiment with the combustibility of goods in
transit. Where experiment or research is necessary to determine the presence
or the degree of danger, the product must not be tried out on the public, nor
must the public be expected to possess the facilities or the technical knowledge
to learn for itself of inherent but latent dangers. The claim that a hazard was
not foreseen is not available to one who did not use foresight appropriate to
his enterprise.
13. Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 35 (5th Cir. 1963)[citing RESTATEMENT, TORTS (SECOND) § 402A comment, Tent. Draft No. 7 1962)] ;
Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 13 (8th Cir. 1964); accord, Green v.
American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
14. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (SECOND) § 402A comment (1965).
15. See, 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.03[4] (1965).
[VOL. 11
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III.
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF CIGARETTES
A. Generally
The application of warranty law to food, when employed in cigarette-
cancer cases, has raised a myriad array of perplexing problems. An
examination of these decisions and the problems encountered therein will
demonstrate the uniqueness of the cigarette in the products liability area.
The courts are in a quandary in determining whether to categorize this
problem within an existing legal pigeonhole or to devise an entirely new
approach.
Cigarette-cancer cases are unlike the usual product liability cases in
that the product involved generally meets all commercial standards, 6
and causation is generally accepted by juries. 17 Moreover, since they are
closely akin to food cases, the requirement of privity is no longer a prob-
lem.18 The controversy in these cases centers rather around the nature
and the scope of the manufacturer's implied warranty. The precise
question posed is whether the manufacturer's liability should be limited
by his inability to gain knowledge of the possible harmful effects which no
developed human skill or foresight could afford him.
B. Green Interpretation
The first significant opinion dealing with this question is Green v.
American Tobacco Co.19 The plaintiff proposing a theory of implied
warranty of fitness for human consumption in the Court of Appeals,
contended that the knowledge of the manufacturer is irrelevant and im-
material to his liability on an implied warranty under Florida law, and
that the warranty is not limited to harmful substances of which the
manufacturer either had knowledge or should have had knowledge or
could have had knowledge according to developed human skill and
16. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 297 (3d Cir. 1961).
[T]he district court could charge the jury that they are to consider the prac-
tices of other cigarette manufacturers and the quality of cigarettes they manufac-
ture as bearing on the question of merchantibility. Such practices, however, are
not conclusive, for 'what usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be
done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence,
whether it usually is complied with or not.'
17. Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964) ; Green v. American
Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
18. 'The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace.'
So said Cardozo in 1931, and has been much quoted since. With the passage of
nearly thirty years, a goodly part of the citadel still holds out; but the assault
goes on with unabated vigor.
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099 (1960). It is submitted that, as to the liability of food producers and
processors, the citadel has been conquered. 10 VILL. L. Rgv. 607, 609 (1965).
19. 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), question certified to Supreme Court of Florida,
154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963), 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963) ; cert. denied, 377 U.S.
943 (1963).
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foresight.2 0 The court interpreted the plaintiff's approach as being a
doctrine of absolute liability.21 Reasoning that the doctrine of absolute
liability was founded on the manufacturer's superior opportuntity to gain
knowledge of the fitness of his product and the consumer's justifiable
reliance on the judgment or skill of the manufacturer, the court concluded
that the manufacturer could not be held as an absolute insurer against
consequences about which no developed human skill and foresight could
afford knowledge and, therefore, under Florida law, no warranty would be
imposed.22
Judge Cameron's dissenting opinion expressed grave doubts about
the majority's interpretation of the status of Florida warranty law, and
reached a conclusion directly opposed to the majority. After a thorough
survey of the Florida case law, 23 he stated unequivocally that the
majority's reasoning was in error. He interpreted these cases as estab-
lishing the principle that, as to items of food or other products in the
original package, which are offered for sale for human consumption or use
generally, the buyer may hold the manufacturer liabile for injuries sus-
tained by him on the theory of an implied warranty of wholesomeness or
fitness of such article or product for the purposes for which it was offered
to the public. He equates this with the imposition of absolute liability un-
affected by any limitation of foreseeability. ". .. [O]ne who warrants
wholesomeness can [not] escape liability by showing that it exercised
reasonable care in its efforts to achieve it. Such an idea is, in my opinion,
a refutation of the whole concept of warranty". 24 The question considered
by the court was restricted to the imposition of liability and did not deal
with the scope of the warranty. The dissent, however, in order to arrive
at its conclusion of absolute liability necessarily decided, by implication,
that foreseeability is inapplicable to both the imposition and the scope
of the warranty. Although this may have been done unconsciously, the
dissent brought to the fore the distinction to be made between the imposi-
tion and the scope of implied warranties in cigarette-cancer cases. On
petition for rehearing, this court, evidently not totally convinced by their
own reasoning and disturbed by the strong dissent of their fellow judges, 25
granted the petition to the extent necessary to certify to the Florida
20. Id. at 73.
21. Absolute liability must be distinguished from strict liability. Absolute
liability has been imposed when the plaintiff alleges an implied warranty of fitness
for human consumption and a jury finds the product unfit. Inability to foresee the
harm is irrelevant. In the case of strict liability, however, the product is not war-
ranted to be foolproof; the warranty is limited by the inability to gain knowledge of
the harm through the utilization of all human skill and foresight.
22. Supra note 19, at 73.
23. From these cases it is obvious that Florida is the vanguard of those states,
as yet numerically in the minority, which are holding purveyors of food and other
products for human consumption to an absolute liability under the doctrine of implied
warranty. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 81 (1962) (dissenting opinion,
n.6) ; see also, Parkinson and Sanders, Implied Warranty in Florida, 12 U. FLA. L.
Rv. 241, 253 (1959).
24. Supra note 19, at 78.
25. Supra note 19, at 77.
[VOL. 11
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Supreme Court the question as to whether the law of Florida imposed
absolute liability under these circumstances. 26
This distinction between imposition and scope of the warranty was
recognized by the Florida Supreme Court in its answer to the certified
question.2 7 The court prefaced its answer by stating that the question as
framed did not present for their consideration a statement of the scope
of the warranty implied in the circumstances of the case.28 The inquiry
was limited to the status of Florida law upon imposition of liability for
breach of implied warranty, when the manufacturer could not, by reason-
able application of human skill or foresight, have known of the danger.
The court stated that the Florida decisions 29 conclusively establish the
principle that a manufacturer's actual knowledge or opportunity for
knowledge of a defective or unwholesome condition is wholly irrelevant
to his liability on an implied warranty, thus answering the certified ques-
tion in the affirmative. 30 It further stated, "To the extent that our cases
take note of the defendant's opportunity for knowledge, it is merely in
recognition of a supplier's superior position relative to the purchasing
public, as a factor affecting policy considerations, rather than determining
the limits of implied warranty liability in a particular situation."3' The
court, going beyond the certified question, appeared to consider the scope
of the warranty in its discussion of the wholesomeness of the product. In
refuting the defendant's contention, the court stated, "wholesomeness of
a product should not be determined on any standard other than its actual
safety for human consumption, when supplied for that purpose ... ",32 and
rejected the argument that prevailing industry standards supplant the
ordinary standard of objective truth and proof, and should be conclusive
on the issue of the product's reasonable fitness for human consumption.
This position arises from the policy of protecting public health from ex-
ploitation by those who, for a profit motive, undertake to supply the ever
increasing variety of products which the people through high pressure
26. Supra note 19, at 86.
Does the law of Florida impose on a manufacturer and distributor of cigarettes
absolute liability, as for breach of implied warranty, for death caused by using
such cigarettes from 1924 or 1925 until February 1, 1956, the cancer having
developed prior to February 1, 1956, and the death occurring February 25, 1958,
when the defendant manufacturer and distributor could not on, or prior to,
February 1, 1956, by the reasonable application of human skill and foresight,
have known that users of such cigarettes would be endangered, by the inhalation
of the main stream smoke from such cigarettes, of contracting cancer of the lung?
27. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
28. Id. at 170. The court also noted that it would not deal with the questions of
causation, privity, or whether the cigarettes, in this instance, were as a matter of law
unmerchantable in Florida.
29. Carter v. Hector Supply Co., 128 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1961); Sencer v. Carl's
Markets, 45 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1950). The latter case illustrates that whatever may
be the scope of an implied warranty in a given case, the basis of such liability is the
undertaking or agreement, imposed by law upon the manufacturer, to be responsible
in the event the thing sold is not in fact merchantable or fit for its ordinary use
or purposes.
30. Supra note 24.
31. Supra note 27, at 171.
32. Supra note 27, at 173.
COMMENTS
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advertising are daily urged to use and consume. Under this interpretation
of Florida law, this court would apply the same standards of products
liability to cigarette manufacturers as they have applied to food manufac-
turers and processors - absolute liability.
The Court of Appeal, after a most sincere expression of their appre-
ciation to the Supreme Court of Florida for their answer to the certified
question, performed a masterpiece of judicial surgery in circumventing
that court's interpretation of Florida law. It accepted the interpretation
given as a proper statement of the status of Florida law on the question,
yet, by narrowly limiting that court's opinion to imposition of liability, it
effectively frustrated the application of Florida law.3 3 Had this court
applied the Florida Supreme Court's statement of Florida law to the
case in light of the interrogatories3 4 answered by the jury in the District
Court, and followed standard prescribed by the Supreme Court for
determining "wholesomeness", 3 5 the inevitable result would have been
the imposition of absolute liability on the defendant-manufacturer, and a
judgment for the plaintiff. This is a necessary implication since the
Florida court had indicated that "actual safety for human consumption"
should be the criteria and the jury expressly found actual causation.
This court, although recognizing that the answered interrogatories
had made the finding, felt compelled to submit to the jury the question as
to whether the cigarettes were reasonably fit and wholesome before they
could render a decision in favor of the plaintiff. Reasoning that the
interrogatories did not exhaust the available defenses, since the district
court required a general verdict 3 6 and not a special verdict in the form
of a special written finding upon each issue of fact,3 7 the court felt that
33. See note 60 infra.
34. (1) Did the decedent Green have primary cancer in his left lung?
Yes (x) No (....)
If your answer is 'yes,' then
(2) Was the cancer in his left lung the cause or one of the causes of his death?
Yes (x) No (.-)
If your answer to the above question is 'yes,' then
(3) Was the smoking of Lucky Strike cigarettes on the part of the decedent,
Green, a proximate cause or one of the proximate causes of the develop-
ment of cancer in his left lung?
Yes (x) No (__)
If your answer to the above question is 'yes,' then
(4) Could the defendant on, or prior to, February 1, 1956, by the reasonable
application of human skill and foresight have known that users of Lucky
Strike cigarettes, such as the decedent Green would be endangered, by
the inhalation of the main stream smoke from Lucky Strike cigarettes,
of contracting cancer of the lung?
Yes (_-) No (x)
35. The contention that the wholesomeness of a product should be determined
on any standard other than its actual safety for human consumption, . . . is a
novel proposition in our law, and one which we are persuaded has no foundation
in the decided cases.
Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169, 173 (Fla. 1963).
36. FaD. R. Civ. P. 49(b).
37. FXD. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
[VOL. 11
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the jury never considered the issue of wholesomeness.88 The court stated
that in these cases there is an undertaking or agreement on the part of
the seller to be responsible in the event the cigarettes are not in fact
reasonably wholesome or fit for human consumption. In light of the
answered interrogatories and the acknowledgment of the certified Florida
law, it seems this court was saying foreseeability did play a role in
determining the scope of the warranty, that is, in defining "reasonably
wholesome."
The apparent conflict between the answer to the certified question and
its application to the case at bar by the circuit court may center about the
deference to be accorded the Florida court's answer. The certification
procedure, 9 although a fine example of judicial cooperation, is subject
to objections that it induces abstract answers by severing legal questions
from the facts which spawned them, and that it elicits advisory opinions
from the answering courts. 40 The answer to such a certified question is
necessarily an advisory opinion since, under existing standards, a Federal
court, although it must apply state law, need only apply court decisions
directly on point. Although such answer is to be given deference, it is
by no means binding. Other factors to be considered by the court in
determining state law are analogous or related state court decisions, the
federal court's own reasoning as to the intended public policy, and any
other reliable data tending to show the status of the state law.41 The
conclusion to be drawn is essentially, that the circuit court accepted
the reasoning of the Florida Supreme Court solely as to the imposition of
absolute liability and proceeded to apply a theory of strict liability as de-
fined by the law of Louisiana 42 and California.43 As the dissenting opinion
38. It appears from the district court's charge to the jury that the written
interrogatories were not intended to cover each and every issue of fact, but, 'they
are interrogatories which counsel described in their arguments, seeking to find
from you your opinion on certain factual matters that have occurred in this trial.'
Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673, 677 (5th Cir. 1963).
39. FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 25.031 (1957) :
The supreme court of this state may, by rule of court, provide that, when
it shall appear to the supreme court of the United States, to any circuit court
of appeals of the United States, or to the court of appeals of the District of
Columbia, that there are involved in any proceeding before it questions or
propositions of the laws of this state, which are determinative of the said cause,
and there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the supreme court
of this state, such federal appellate court may certify such questions or propositions
of the laws of this state to the supreme court of this state for instructions con-
cerning such questions or propositions of state law, which certificate the supreme
court of this state, by written opinion, may answer.
40. 111 U. PA. L. Rev. 344, 350 (1963).
41. 1A MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrICE, 0.309[2] (2d ed. 1965).
42. Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F. 2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
43. 2 HARPER & JAM S, ToRTs § 28.22, p. 1584 (1961) :
In a recent California case the court said, 'the essential inquiry, thus, is the
same in respect to the breach of warranty theory as to the negligence claim;
whether the defendant complied with the standard of reasonable care in ascer-
taining the fitness of the chattel for the use for which he knew it was hired.
Tierstein v. Licht, 174 Cal. App. 2d 835, 345 P.2d 341 (1959). It is submitted that
this case deals with the bailment of a chattel, and this area is not relevant to a con-
sideration of absolute liability in the food or cigarette cases.
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of Judge Cameron 44 so aptly stated, it would be a complete rejection of
the law of warranty to hold that it could be abrogated by requiring the
plaintiff to show that cigarettes were not reasonably fit and wholesome for
use by the general public, even though he had already proven himself
injured by the smoking of cigarettes. The words "reasonably fit and
wholesome" as used in this warranty are intended to demonstrate the
universality of its application. The warranty extends to every member
of the public, covering the liability of the tobacco company to each separate
individual to whom a sale is made. "The finding of the jury has settled
the fact that the cigarettes sold to Green were not reasonably fit and
wholesome for use by him. No other question is, in my opinion, involved
under the law of Florida, with which, alone we are dealing. '45 From this
statement it would appear that Judge Cameron would apply a theory of
absolute liability, requiring the showing of (1) the sale of an item war-
ranted to be fit and wholesome, (2) an injury to the plaintiff and (3)
proof that the product caused the plaintiff's injury. Thus, the causal
relationship between the use of the warranted product and the injury
would be sufficient to render the product unfit and unwholesome according
to the Florida Supreme Court's standard of its actual safety for con-
sumption.46 A product cannot be actually safe if its basic nature and
content has caused injury.
In the adjudication of a suit based solely upon the diversity of citizen-
ship of the parties, the federal court is in effect only another court of the
state. ". . . It cannot afford recovery if the right to recover is made
unavailable by the State nor can it substantially affect the enforcement of
the right as given by the State."'47 "The nub of the policy that underlies
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same transaction the accident of a
suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court
a block away, should not lead to a substantially different result. ' 48 Though
the advisory opinion issued by the Florida Supreme Court is not binding
upon the federal courts of Florida, in rejecting at least a portion of this
decision the appellate court has created the situation so vehemently con-
demned by the Erie-Guaranty Trust Doctrine.
C. Lartigue Interpretation
The appellate court in Green49 used, as substantial authority for their
decision, the case of Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.50 As afore-
mentioned, the court applied the strict liability test of Lartigue, a decision
rendered in accordance with an interpretation of the Civil Code of
44. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673, 681 (5th Cir. 1963).
45. Ibid.
46. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
47. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945).
48. Id. at 109.
49. 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963).
50. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
[VOL. 1 1
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Louisiana.'1 The facts of Lartigue are essentially the same as those of
Green. This action to compensate for the death of the plaintiff's husband
from cancer of the larynx, allegedly caused by his smoking of the defendant-
manufacturer's cigarettes asserted claims in both negligence and breach of
implied warranty. The district court rendered judgment on the jury's
general verdict for the defendant. The appellant contended that the
trial judge's instructions52 to the jury on the nature of the implied war-
ranty were contrary to Louisiana law. The court acknowledged that such
terms as "knowledge", "reasonable diligence", "reasonably foreseeable",
"reasonably fit" and "reasonable care" are ordinarily associated with
negligence, but determined that they are properly used when recovery is
sought against a manufacturer on the ground of breach of warranty. These
terms define the nature and scope of a manufacturer's so-called "war-
ranty" (law-imposed duty) to consumers.53 The foreseeability relevant to
warranty was differentiated from that applied in negligence. "It is not the
foreseeability of unreasonable risks, but rather the foreseeability of the
kinds of risks which the enterprise is likely to create. '54 Warranty under
Louisiana law was characterized as ". . . not contractual but as strict
liability in tort, independent of negligence." 55  The court interpreted
Louisiana law to mean that the manufacturer's warranty is almost tanta-
mount to making him an insurer but only as against foreseeable risks.
Thus, the standard of safety of the goods is the same under the warranty
theory as under the negligence theory. 56 It was observed that, thus far,
public policy has not decreed absolute liability for the harmful effects
which no developed skill or foresight can avoid.
The progression of events in the Green-Lartigue relationship, when
fully appreciated, points up the confusion which pervades the cigarette
cases. It must be observed that: (1) the initial Green decision affirmed
the district court's application of a foreseeability limitation on implied
warranty liability; (2) Lartigue accepted the limitation imposed by the
district court, using Green5 7 as authority; (3) The Supreme Court of
Florida, in answer to the certified question, held the district court's
interpretation of Florida law erroneous in its application of the foresee-
51. LA. Civ. CoDE arts. 2315, 2316, 2475, 2476, 2520, 2531, 2545, 2547 (Supp. 1965).
52. ". . . The warranty of general quality which is implied by Louisiana law is
only as to those qualities of which a manufacturer can have knowledge in the exercise
of reasonable diligence, the absence of which causes damages that is reasonably
foreseeable." Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Co., supra note 50, at 23.
53. Id. at 24.
54. James, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 24 TXNN. L. REv. 923, 925 (1957).
Since the basic philosophy of warranty law is to provide a plaintiff with a
cause of action when in a negligence action he could not show the requisite
elements, it appears that this application of foreseeability as a limitation on the
scope of the warranty, imposes on the plaintiff a more difficult burden than lie
would have faced in a negligence action.
55. Supra note 50, at 26.
56. Supra note 50, at 37. Under this theory the goods are not warranted to be
foolproof or incapable of producing injury.
57. 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
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ability limitation to the imposition of warranty liability in Green58 ; The
Green Circuit Court then accepted the answer to the certified question
to the extent that under Florida Law, foreseeability would not be applied
when imposing absolute liability. However, it remanded the case to the
district court for jury consideration of the issue of whether the product
was "reasonably wholesome", citing Lartigue as authority for this proposi-
tion. To emphasize the obvious, upon its initial consideration of Green,
the appellate court affirmed the district court; Lartigue then cited the
Green court of appeals decision; subsequently, the Green district court's
interpretation of Florida law was found erroneous by the Supreme Court
of Florida; the second consideration of Green by the appellate court then
cited Lartigue, which, in effect, amounted to citing their own prior
erroneous affirmation of the district court.
D. Ross Interpretation
The next significant decision in the area was Ross v. Phillip Morris
and Co.5 9 The facts, being essentially the same as those already discussed
in Green and Lartigue, need not be reiterated. 60 The plaintiff's main con-
tention on appeal concerned the district court's charge to the jury on the
nature and scope of defendant's warranties. The plaintiff proposed a jury
instruction that Missouri ". . . law implies a warranty of fitness for human
consumption to the smoker of such products irrespective of whether the
manufacturer did not know, or even could not have known, in the exercise
of the ultimate in care, skill and foresight, that the product may have con-
tained any harmful, dangerous and deleterious substances or ingredients."'
The district court, in rejecting the suggested charge, applied a foreseeability
limitation to the scope of the manufacturer's implied warranty. The cir-
cuit court found the instruction to be the correct interpretation of Missouri
law,6 2 reasoning that ". . . under the proper factual situation, the Missouri
courts would impose the same strict liability upon a manufacturer of
58. 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963). The Florida Supreme Court did not intend to
limit their answer to the imposition of liability, for they unequivocally stated that the
test of wholesomeness to be that of "actual safety," which intimates that foreseeability
is irrelevant when considering an implied warranty as to food in Florida.
59. 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
60. The plaintiff's complaint alleged three counts: (1) breach of an implied war-
ranty, (2) negligence, (3) fraud and deceit by false advertising. On this appeal, the
only remaining count was that of breach of implied warranty.
61. Supra note 59, at 6. This instruction would require a verdict for the plaintiff
if the jury found that there were harmful carcinogenic substances in the defendant's
product and that the smoking of the defendant's product caused the plaintiff's injury.
62. It is interesting to note that the court focused its attention on cigarette-cancer
cases from other jurisdictions in attempting to determine the nature and scope of this
warranty. Having all of the Green decisions before it, this court interpreted the
Florida Supreme Court's answer to the certified question as stating that under Florida
law, implied warranty liability is not limited by the foreseeability doctrine, the
"reasonable application of human skill and foresight" test of tort liability. However,
merely because the district below, referred to Green with approval before the Florida
Supreme Court responded contrarily in the certification proceeding, they did not feel
compelled to hold that the Missouri Supreme Court would arrive at the same con-
clusion as the Florida Court. Supra note 59, at 12. Query, is this the interpretation
that the Fifth Circuit should have given to the Florida Supreme Court's opinion as to
the status of that state's law?
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cigarettes as has been applied in the food and beverage cases.1163 Con-
siderations of public policy and the protection of the health of the con-
suming public require ". . . that his liability should be made absolute." 64
Public policy desirious of protecting the health of the consumer has given
rise to the presumption of foreseeability on the part of the manufacturer.
This presumption is not difficult to impose, since the deleterious effects of
any adulteration or putrefication of a pure food product are readily
foreseeable.
Once again, the court reasoned that the imposition of absolute liability
upon the manufacturer was dependent upon his possessing a superior
position to gain knowledge of the contents of the product which he places
on the market. In the court's considered view, under the facts in this case,
they ". . . failed to comprehend how the ends of justice could be served by
adopting the fiction that the manufacturer of cigarettes was - as early
as 1934 (when plaintiff began smoking defendants cigarettes exclusively)
- in a better position, except in theory, than the consumer to ascertain
the now highly-publicized causative relationship between smoking and
cancer. . ". ."6 Citing Lartigue,6 6 the court held that, thus far, public
policy has not decreed absolute liability for those harmful effects which
no developed skill or foresight could avoid. Though the manufacturer may
be an insurer against the unknown, that is not his status in regard to the
unknowable. 67
IV.
FOOD LAW OR NEW LAW
Admittedly, the law of products liability is in a state of flux; guidelines
are not sharp and clear, and the warranties (such as they are now)
overlap.6 8 As aforementioned, the crux of this problem is whether or
not there is a breach, if the defect or hazard is one which, at the time
of the product's manufacture and distribution, was scientifically unknow-
able.6 9 When the courts impose a foreseeability limitation on the implied
warranty, in essence, they are asking, "It there a breach?" Lartigue°
and Ross7 hold that, since such a defect or hazard is not foreseeable,
63. Supra note 59, at 8.
64. Williams v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 285 S.W. 53, 55 (Mo. App. 1955). Thus,
this strict liability as applied to food and beverage cases is tantamount to absolute
liability; however, these cases involve products containing readily identifiable foreign
matter, inherently nauseous, deleterious, or putrid. In every case the risk of harm
could reasonably have been foreseen as a consequence of the defect. Ross v. Philip
Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 9 (8th Cir. 1964).
65. Supra note 59, at 8.
It is perhaps tempting in the light of knowledge of today to create the thought
that defendant should have been aware of the cancer-smoking relationship. ...
However, it should be carefully noted that this case must be decided on the facts
as they existed in the light of the knowledge of the early 1 930's to 1952.
66. Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 39, 40 (5th Cir. 1963).
67. Supra note 59, at 11.
68. Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 39 (1963).
69. 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.03[4] (1965).
70. Supra note 68.
71. Supra note 59.
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no warranty on the manufacturer's part can arise as to it. Hence, even
though a jury could find the cigarettes "unwholesome" or "not reasonably
fit", liability will not be imposed on the cigarette manufacturer.7 2 There-
fore, since no warranty arises, no breach can be found.
In Green,73 however, the court found that foreseeability does not
limit the imposition of implied warranty liability in Florida. The warranty
does arise. Whether it has been breached will be determined by the
jury. Their finding that the cigarettes were not reasonably, wholesome will
impose warranty liability. Under this interpretation, the foreseeability
limitation defines the scope of the warranty though it does not affect
imposition.
The courts categorize cigarettes as food and state that they are
applying food law.7 4 However, whether, in fact, this is food law and
further, whether such should be applied remain questionable propositions.
The liability of the food manufacturer, whether labeled strict 75 or absolute
is a tantamount to holding him as an insurer, since all risks incident to
adulterated or defective food are foreseeable; once causation is deter-
mined, the issue of foreseeability is irrelevant. It is submitted that the
courts, in effect, are not applying food law to the cigarette-cancer cases,
since foreseeability has been considered. In doing so, the courts have
reverted to more general concepts of strict liability.
This reluctance on the part of the courts to hold the manufacturer to
the special responsibility of a food manufacturer is due to the unique
nature of cigarettes. They differ from food products in that the attendant
risks could not, and still may not, be foreseen.7 6 The policy considera-
tions that gave birth to absolute liability in the area of food products are
primarily: (1) the manufacturer's superior position for detecting any
defects in his product, and the presumed reliance of the public on that
position ;77 (2) the coercive effect that flows from the imposition of absolute
liability;78 and (3) the distribution of loss effect.79 When the cigarette
72. In these two cases, the issue of unwholesomeness was never submitted to
the jury, since the courts first considered whether or not a warranty had arisen and
disposed of the cases at that point.
73. Supra note 44.
As suggested by Judge Cameron, the finding by the jury of proximate causa-
tion settles the issue in favor of holding that the cigarettes were not reasonably fit
and wholesome for use by the plaintiff. Supra note 44, at 681. This is an application
of the "actual safety" test as enunciated by the Florida Supreme Court. Supra
note 58, at 173.
74. Supra note 13.
75. Strict liability as applied to food has been defined as imposing a special
responsibility upon the manufacturer over and above the general concept of strict
liability. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
76. James, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 24 TENN. L. Rv. 923, 925 (1957).
"It is not the foreseeability of unreasonable risks, but rather the foreseeability of
the kinds of risks the enterprise is likely to create." Ibid.
77. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
78. Holding the manufacturer to such a high standard forces him to maintain
a high standard of quality in his product. This is also termed a "deterrent effect." 63
COLUM. L. Rev. 515, 530 (1963).
79. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499 (1961) ; Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process - the
Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 555 (1961).
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manufacturer's position is considered in light of these policy considerations,
some distinctions become obvious. The manufacturer has no superior
position to detect the unwholesome characteristics of its products, since
there is conclusive evidence to the effect that such agents could not have
been discovered by the reasonable application of human skill and foresight.
Therefore, this policy should not demand the application of absolute lia-
bility. 0 Imposition of a coercive element is, likewise, of questionable
significance when considered in this context. In the case of cigarettes,
because of the high standards of reasonable care required by negligence
laws with regard to both manufacture and research, it is somewhat sus-
pect that any greater deterent effect would flow from the imposition of
absolute liability. In any case, it is highly doubtful that greater care could
lead to a safer product. The distribution of loss effect presents the best
argument for the imposition of absolute liability, where the manufacturer
could not have known the risk. In such a situation, the manufacturer is
in a much better position to secure insurance for such a risk, and to finance
such protection through an increase in the sales price. In this way, the
smokers who indulge in this costly luxury would insure each other through
policies administered by the manufacturers.
In light of the foregoing discussion, it is submitted that the only
reason for the imposition of absolute liability in a cigarette case is to
distribute the risk. In food cases, this is the least important of the policy
considerations, and it should be of no greater importance in cigarette
cases. It is submitted that the courts in Green, Lartigue and Ross, although
at times suffering from conceptual confusion, were correct in refusing to
apply the doctrine of absolute liability, as such a doctrine would cure no
ills. Rather, it could destroy an industry which only legislation, if any-
thing, should be permitted to seriously affect. The case most compatible
with the foregoing discussion is Ross v. Philip Morris & Co.8s This court
found no controlling public policy which compelled absolute liability, or
even made it desirable, for harmful effects which no developed skill or fore-
sight could avoid. However, in the proper circumstances, that is, where the
harm could be foreseen by the manufacturer, this court would impose
liability. Therefore, a plaintiff's action will not be foreclosed, but only
forestalled until the day he can show that it was unreasonable for the
manufacturer to place the cigarettes on the market. At the same time, this
will give the manufacturer additional time, in light of present scientific
developments, either to take added precautions in the manufacture of his
product, or to secure the necessary liability protection. He will not,
therefore, be held liable for the harmful consequences of putting on the
market a socially desirable product, the wholesomeness of which no human
foresight or scientific skills can determine.
80. 63 COLUm. L. Rev. 515, 530 (1963).
81. Supra note 59.
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V.
EXPRESS WARRANTY
A more favorable approach for a plaintiff in the cigarette-cancer area
is an action based on express warranty. An express warranty arises where
a seller, supplier, or manufacturer makes a positive representation of fact
concerning the goods he sells, 2 while an implied warranty, either that a
product is merchantable or fit for a particular purpose, is imposed by
operation of law.
In Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 83 the plaintiff claimed
damages for personal injury, alleging that he contracted lung cancer as a
result of having smoked Chesterfield cigarettes for many years. Discussion
of this case is valuable only to the extent of its consideration of the express
warranty issue, all other causes of action having been abandoned. 4 The
plaintiff based his express warranty claim on newspaper advertisements,85
assurances of wholesomeness in national magazines 6 and a systematic
and nationwide advertising campaign culminating in statements on a
national television program featuring Arthur Godfrey. In essence, these
statements assured the smoker that "Nose, throat, and accessory organs
[are] not adversely affected by smoking Chesterfields."87 On initial appeal,
the court found, "the evidence compellingly points to an express warranty,
by the defendant, by means of various advertising media, not only re-
peatedly assuring plaintiff that smoking Chesterfields was absolutely harm-
less, but in addition the jury could very well have concluded that there
were express assurances of no harmful effect on the lungs.88 On remand,
82. UNIFORM SALES AcT § 12.
Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an
express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to
induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods
relying thereon.
See also, UNIFORM COMMtRCIAL CODg § 2-313, 1962 official text, which provides
in the pertinent part:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform
to the affirmation or promise.
83. 134 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Pa. 1955), 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), 350 F.2d 479
(3d Cir. 1965).
84. Plaintiff brought suit on counts of negligence and breach of warranty, both
express and implied. Since the plaintiff's purchases and smoking of the manufacturers
cigarettes, plus the removal of the plaintiff's lung occurred before the effective date
of the Uniform Commercial Code (July 1, 1954) this action was controlled by the
Uniform Sales Act. It is submitted that the application of the Uniform Commercial
Code would not affect the outcome of this case.
85. The Pittsburgh Press, July 16, 1934; "A good cigarette can cause no ills
and cure no ailments . . . but it gives you a lot of pleasure, peace of mind and
comfort." Later that month (The Pittsburgh Press, July 26, 1934) it was said: "There
is no purer cigarette made than Chesterfields."
86. Time, February 20, 1950; Life, February 23, March 23, April 20, June 1,
August 3, and August 10, 1953; Saturday Evening Post, December 19, 1931.
87. Life, January 26, 1953; Program of September 17 and 24, 1952.
88. 295 F.2d at 296; see statements by defendant, supra notes 85, 86, 87.
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the district court submitted the issues to the jury on a series of special
interrogatories, of which all except one were answered adversely to the
plaintiff. The jury found: (1) the plaintiff's smoking of Chesterfield
Cigarettes was the cause or one of the causes of the cancer; (2) the
defendant was not charageable with negligence; (3) the defendant made
no express warranties upon which the plaintiff relied and by which he
was induced to purchase the cigarettes; and (4) the plaintiff assumed the
risk of injury by smoking the cigarettes. A judgment for the defendant
in accord with the special findings was entered.8 9
The breach of warranty issue was tried on the assumption that reli-
ance by the purchaser was an essential element of an express warranty as
defined by statute, and therefore requisite for a cause of action for its
breach. The plaintiff endeavored to show that the advertisements were
an inducement to the public and, in reliance thereon, he regularly pur-
chased and smoked Chesterfields. His testimony apparently failed to
impress the jury.90 The appellate court, upon its consideration of the
second district court proceedings, held that, although their instructions
were a correct statement of majority rule concerning reliance, that rule is
not applicable where the factual affirmations run to the public and
their natural tendency is to induce a purchase. 91 Therefore, these instruc-
tions were erroneous and the only issue was whether the factual affirma-
tions contained in the many advertisements were such as would naturally
tend to induce the buyer to purchase the goods.92
The other interrogatory of concern to the appellate court was that
which related to assumption of the risk. This court held that when
defining assumption of the risk, a distinction must be made between its
primary and secondary applications. Assumption of the risk in its secondary
sense is somewhat analogous to contributory negligence and involves a
failure to exercise reasonable care for one's own safety. 3 Since contribu-
tory negligence is not available as a defense in an action for personal
injury based on breach of warranty (since this action is in contract)
assumption of the risk in that, the secondary sense, is likewise not available.
Assumption of the risk in its primary and strict sense, however, involves
voluntary exposure to an obvious or known danger which negates liability.
Under this concept, recovery, even in warranty, is foreclosed because
the plaintiff is assumed to have relieved the defendant of any duty to
protect him.94 Under Pennsylvania law, persons who voluntarily expose
themselves to a danger of which they have knowledge, or have had notice,
89. 350 F.2d at 482.
90. Id. at 483.
91. Ibid.
92. Id. at 484. Although the court stated that in this situation reliance is irrelevant,
a showing that the "factual affirmations run to the public and their natural tendency is
to induce a purchase" is the equivalent of proving reliance.
93. 350 F.2d at 484, Citing Potter v. Brittan, 286 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1961)
HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 22.2, p. 1201; PROSSER, TORTS § 55 (2d ed. 1955).
94. Ibid.
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assume the attendant risk, 5 and in this sense assumption of the risk is
available as a defense to an action on breach of warranty. Finding that the
issue raised by the defense was submitted to the jury on instructions
which were inadequate and confusing in that they failed to differentiate
between the primary and secondary concepts, and that the jury had no
evidence upon which to predicate a determination that the plaintiff either
knew or had notice of the harmful effects of Chesterfields, the court held
the instruction to be erroneous.
It is highly doubtful that the Pritchard circumstances will again
arise. But, if so, or if someone brings himself within the already existing
facts, the most recent Pritchard decision makes it obvious that express
warranty is the more favorable approach for the plaintiff.9 6 He will not be
faced with a foreseeability limitation on the manufacturer's warranty.
The manufacturer will be held to his word. Once the plaintiff establishes:
(1) that the language used by the manufacturer created a warranty, (2) that
the warranty was intended to induce purchases, and (3) that cigarettes were
the proximate cause of the injury, the burden then shifts to the defendant,
whose only defense will be assumption of the risk. At this time, the
defense is of no avail, since the plaintiff had no knowledge of the risk and
could not have voluntarily exposed himself to it. It is submitted, however,
that this will be a valuable defense in the future and determinative of a
cigarette-cancer case, since manufacturers have now put the plaintiff on
notice by publishing the following statement on each pack of cigarettes:
"Caution: Cigarette Smoking May be Hazardous To Your Health".
Although this warning may not negate a warranty, it may preclude a
smoker's action based on that warranty.
VI.
CONCLUSION
It is suggested that strict food law cannot be applied to cigarette
warranties, since the cigarette (and its harmful consequences) is some-
thing completely unique to the area of products liability. Although these
concepts may be used to draw guidelines, a court should not blindly
categorize cigarettes with food, since this product necessitates a com-
pletely new range of ideas concerning manufacturers liability. Although,
at present, these ideas are very ill-defined, the increasing number of
cigarette-cancer cases, coupled with the insatiable quest of legal scholar-
ship, will bring about the day when these ideas may be resolved into
another legal pigeonhole.
John A. Luchsinger
Joseph A. Tate
95. 350 F.2d at 485, Citing Kopp v. R. S. Noonan, Inc., 385 Pa. 460, 123 A.2d
429 (1956) ; Cutler v. Peck Lumber Mfg. Co., 350 Pa. 8, 37 A.2d 739 (1944).
96. Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956), 256
F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1958), cert. '.enied, 358 U.S. 875 (1959).
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